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Subject to Review? Consideration, Liquidated Damages and the Penalty Jurisdiction 
 
 
Dr Eliza Mik 
Assistant Professor 
Singapore Management University, School of Law 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the relationship between what seem to be basic principles in contract law: 
“consideration need not be adequate” and “the rule against penalties applies only to sums payable on 
breach.” The ‘reluctant inspiration’ lies in the recent Australian case of Andrews v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd, which establishes that the absence of breach or an obligation to avoid the 
occurrence of an event upon which a sum becomes payable, does not render such sum incapable of 
being characterized as a penalty. This decision constitutes an unexpected divergence from the position 
in most other common law jurisdictions. What are its practical implications? Should we even engage in 
historical arguments given that the penalty jurisdiction evolved at the time where the law did not 
recognize enforceable promises to perform? The paper commences with broad observations regarding 
the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, the increasingly commercial approach to evaluating 
whether a pre-estimate of loss is “genuine” and the necessity to treat sums payable on breach as part 
of the commercial bargain. The more liberal the attitude with regards to the amount (i.e. the higher the 
sum that can be stipulated), the more limited the effect of the rule against penalties. A liberal approach 
does not affect the contract breaker’s ability to invoke the rule but his ability to succeed. In 
combination with the description of the performance, the price and the limitation of liability (if any), 
sums payable on breach often point towards a transaction-specific risk allocation. In many instances 
such sums come dangerously close to primary obligations. And courts do not, as a matter of principle, 
review primary obligations. Once this is acknowledged, it becomes even more difficult to justify any 
attempts to expand the scope of the penalty jurisdiction beyond payments triggered by breach.  
 
After confronting some of the historical arguments made by the court in Andrews, the paper analyzes 
the recurring attempts to extend judicial review of contractual payments by creating “hybrid 
stipulations” – sums that are neither payable on breach nor in return for contractual performance. A 
difficult theoretical exercise awaits: should we create artificial divisions between contractual payments 
to establish whether they can be reviewed? Or should we finally acknowledge that all sums payable 
under a contract are part of the commercial bargain? On one hand, doctrinal integrity may point 
towards the need to vigorously defend the present form of the rule against penalties, including its 
(seemingly) strict limitation to sums payable on breach. On the other, some arguments made in 
Andrews and in other recent cases highlight the theoretical inconsistencies of its current formulation. 
After all, the “breach/no breach” dichotomy can also be regarded as a device for avoiding judicial 
scrutiny. At present, on the basis of Andrews alone it appears incorrect to use an institution that 
prohibits deterrence from breach to review the commercial substance of contracts. The rule against 
penalties reflects the general equitable principle not to enforce oppressive or unconscionable 
transactions. It does not reform commercially imprudent transactions. Given its exceptional nature, the 
penalty jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly - even with regards to sums payable on breach. Once 
sums payable on breach are regarded as part of commercial bargain, it is more difficult to subject them 
to review. If, however, payment is unrelated to the breach of a contractual promise, it comes 
dangerously close to being a contractual promise.  Any review seems unacceptable.  
Introduction  
Parties to a contract are free to agree that a specific sum will be payable upon a specific breach. Such 
provisions, popularly referred to as liquidated damages clauses, perform important commercial and 
legal functions. The parties’ freedom to agree on a sum is limited by the so-called rule against 
penalties: the sum must compensate the aggrieved party for the loss anticipated to result from the 
breach. It must not penalize the contract breaker or deter him from breach and therefore, indirectly, 
force performance. The rule against penalties restricts the freedom of contract1 and constitutes an 
exception to the principle pacta sunt servanda. It is axiomatic that courts generally do not review 
contractual payments for fairness or adequacy. Freedom of contract encompasses the freedom to agree 
on any consideration and on any risk allocation. Despite being a rule of public policy, the rule against 
penalties is not absolute. It becomes relevant only if invoked by a contract breaker who is called upon 
to pay. As courts do not examine sums payable on breach ex officio, even deterrent sums are 
enforceable by default. The rule often assists opportunistic contract breakers because the sum may be 
subject to judicial scrutiny even without being prima facie excessive or deterrent. This paper examines """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Elsey v J.G. Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd. (1978) 83 DLRI at 15 
2 Murray v Leisureplay Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963;  Talal El Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA 1539  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512582 
 2"
the increasing tension between two basic principles: “courts do not review the adequacy of 
consideration” and “the rule against penalties applies only to sums payable on breach.” (What would be 
an indicator of adequacy anyway? How can liquidated damages function without loss resulting from 
breach?) More importantly, it discusses the recent attempts to remove the “breach limitation.” The 
focus on this controversial modification of the penalty jurisdiction diverts attention from the fact that 
other components of the rule are becoming equally unsettled. The latter trend is less spectacular than 
the potential removal of the breach limitation, but not less destabilizing for the certainty of commercial 
dealings.  
 
Background 
Any discussion of contractual payments activated by breach takes place against an increasingly 
“blurred” background. Three issues must be kept separate. The first is: when will the courts review 
contractual payments? This question is synonymous with “what is the scope of the penalty jurisdiction?” 
This area has recently become controversial due to certain developments in Australia, where the High 
Court unequivocally stated that the rule against penalties encompasses sums activated by events other 
than breach. It has, however, been settled for over a century that the rule applies only to payments 
activated by breach. Unfortunately, even English courts use inconsistent language and it is often 
unclear whether a sum is enforceable because it does not fall within the penalty jurisdiction or whether 
it does but is not a penalty in casu. The second question is: what constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of 
loss? There is a lot of uncertainty in this area due to different judicial approaches regarding the 
benchmark against which sums payable on breach are to be compared. Moreover, there have been 
attempts to replace the traditional dichotomy between liquidated damages and penalties with a more 
complex approach which permits sums that are not a genuine pre-estimate to be enforceable as long as 
they are commercially justified.2 In other words, we may no longer have a clear division between sums 
payable on breach that overcompensate and deter and those that do not. We may have a new category 
of payments that overcompensate without being deterrent. The third question concerns the very 
existence of an obligation. This question is rarely posed by itself and usually forms part of the analysis 
regarding the scope of the penalty jurisdiction. After all, without an obligation there can be no breach. 
This issue seems preliminary and separate from the other two, at the same time, it is here that courts 
often engage in creative interpretations of the contract. Due to inconsistent approaches, it is 
increasingly difficult to anticipate how courts will interpret particular provisions. Judicial creativity in 
“finding” an obligation or denying its existence may lead to an indirect expansion or contraction of the 
penalty doctrine. In sum, we are not only facing attempts to expand the penalty jurisdiction beyond 
breach, but also increasing uncertainty as to how to calculate sums payable on breach and as to whether 
a particular provision imposes an obligation capable of breach. Parallel developments concern the 
increasing recognition that the contrast between primary and secondary obligations may not be as clear 
as popularly assumed. To complicate matters further, there are also attempts to create “new” categories 
of provisions that seem related to primary obligations but cannot be breached.  
 
Dunlop and criteria of differentiation 
Although this paper does not focus on the second question mentioned above, we must briefly discuss it 
for two reasons. First, it is impossible to analyze contractual payments on breach without mentioning 
the main case on the subject, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company, Limited v. New Garage and Motor 
Company3 (“Dunlop”) and without explaining the criteria for distinguishing penalties from liquidated 
damages. Second, it is important to understand the interplay between the scope of the penalty 
jurisdiction and the pre-estimate of loss. The distinction between penalties and liquidated damages is a 
question of construction, judged at the time of formation. If the sum constitutes a genuine pre-estimate 
of loss, it is enforceable without proof and regardless of the actual loss suffered by the aggrieved 
party.4 If it is not, the sum is considered a penalty and will not be enforced. In the latter instance, loss 
must be proven in a conventional manner. The traditional dichotomy points to a simple choice: a sum 
payable on breach is either compensatory i.e. it constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of loss or deterrent 
i.e. it penalizes the contract breaker. All discussions of the distinction commence with Dunlop. The 
case deals exclusively with the question whether a sum constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of loss, not 
with the event that prompts its payment. Dunlop, however, unambiguously assumes that the question 
arises only if payment is activated by breach. Although it is important to distinguish between these 
issues, it is impossible to completely isolate one from another. Courts take different approaches to the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 Murray v Leisureplay Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963;  Talal El Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA 1539  
3 [1915] A.C. 79 
4 Harvey McGregor, Mc Gregor on Damages, 18th ed Sweet and Maxwell 2012, (“McGregor”) para 13-021  
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degree of precision required in estimating loss.5 Some courts adopt a neutral approach and compare the 
sum with the loss that could flow from the breach.6 Some courts are liberal and require nothing short of 
extortion or extravagance.7 Other courts display an actuarial attitude and analyze the stipulated sum in 
fine detail.8 The general tendency, however, is to allow higher sums as long as the parties are able to 
commercially justify their calculation.9 The more liberal the attitude with regards to the amount that 
can be stipulated to be payable upon breach, the lesser the effect of the rule against penalties. A liberal 
approach does not limit the contract breaker’s ability invoke the rule. It does, however, limit his ability 
to succeed. Questions concerning the genuine pre-estimate of loss are part of a broader discussion 
concerning the ability to contractually adjust the principles governing the ascertainment of damages10 
and to compensate for types of loss, which are not recognized by the law.11 The benchmark can be the 
actual loss likely to be suffered12 or the legally recoverable loss, i.e. common law damages.13 
Developments in the general law on damages will inevitably affect the practical application of the rule 
and thus, indirectly, the scope of the penalty jurisdiction. It must be noted that the latter has evolved 
independently from the concept of loss and damages. The latter have undergone many reformulations, 
while the rule against penalties (in its rudimentary form) remained relatively static. Given the 
increasing sophistication in the calculation of damages, including the maturation of the doctrine of 
remoteness and more refined approaches as to what types of loss are compensable,14 the pre-estimation 
of loss has become a challenging exercise.   
 
The “Breach Limitation” 
The penalty jurisdiction concerns only payments triggered by breach.15 This is often referred to as “the 
breach limitation.” Otherwise, as a matter of principle, courts do not review contractual payments, i.e. 
inquire into the adequacy of consideration to determine whether the values of the reciprocal contractual 
obligations are comparable. The breach limitation is often discussed in the context of primary and 
secondary obligations. Primary obligations are those that have been expressly or impliedly assumed 
under the contract.16 They are synonymous with performance, consideration, price. Every failure to 
perform a primary obligation is a breach of contract and gives rise to a secondary obligation to 
compensate for the resulting loss.17 Parties are free to agree to whatever exclusion or modification of 
all types of obligations as long as the agreement retains the legal characteristics of a contract. The 
parties must not, however, offend against the rule against penalties, i.e. impose upon the breaker of a 
primary obligation a secondary obligation to pay “a sum of money that is manifestly intended to be in 
excess of the amount, which would fully compensate the other party for the loss sustained by him in 
consequence of the breach of the primary obligation.”18 The penalty jurisdiction relates exclusively to 
secondary obligations.19 A review of primary obligations would infringe the principle that courts do not 
examine the adequacy of consideration.  
 
Form or substance?  
The importance of a legal principle can often be measured by the difficulty of its circumvention. At 
times, the penalty jurisdiction appears easy to avoid. In Lombard North Central Plc. v. Butterworth20 
the defendant hired a computer from a finance company. Timely payment of rental was a condition. In 
default of punctual payment, the defendant had to pay all outstanding rentals and a sum representing all """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd v Tilebox [2005] ABC.L.R.02/25 at 48 
6 M Furmston ed., The Law of Contract (4th edn Lexis Nexis Butterworths, London 2010) para 8.117 
7 e.g. Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] A.C. 6 at 10 
8 N Andrews, M Clarke et al., Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies (London 2011) para 25-008, 
observe that the application of the penalty doctrine became almost a mathematical exercise. 
9 Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd v Tilebox [2005] ABC.L.R.02/25 
10 Chen-Wishart, ‘Controlling the Power to Agree Damages’ in Birks (ed) Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty First Century 
(Oxford 1996) at 271; B Coote, ‘Contract as Assumption and Remoteness of Damage’ (2010) 26 JCL 211  
11 Garry A. Muir, ‘Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums’ (1985) Sydney Law Review at 511 
12 A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 2004, (“Burrows”) at 446-447. 
13 Law Commission Working Paper Number 61 Penalty Clauses and Forfeitures of Monies Paid, 1975, para.44; Robophone 
Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All E.R. 128 at 1446, 1447; see also: Lansat Shipping Co v Glencore Grain BV [2009] 1 C.L.C. 
379 at 388 
14 See generally: E McKendrick, M Graham, ‘The Sky is the Limit: Contractual Damages for Non-pecuniary Loss’ (2002) 
LMCLQ 16 at 167 
15 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 W.L.R. 399 at 401; Jervis v Harris [1996] Ch 
195; M & J Polymers Ltd v Imerys Minerals Ltd [2008] EWHC 344; Euro London Appointments Ltd v Claessens International 
Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 385; Snell’s Equity, 32nd ed., John McGhee ed., (London 2012) para 13-002   
16 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827 at 849 
17 [1980] A.C. 827 at 849 
18 [1980] A.C. 827 at 850  
19 Snell above at note 15 at 407 
20  [1987] Q.B. 527 
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future rentals. Although the sum was a penalty, the court had to enforce it. The reasoning was as 
follows: the parties can make any term a condition. A breach of condition entitles the injured party to 
terminate the contract and claim loss of bargain damages.21 A provision prescribing what damages are 
payable upon breach can be “struck down” as a penalty, if it is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss. A 
provision making a term a condition, however, is not subject to the penalty jurisdiction.22  The 
difference “is one of drafting form, and wholly without substance.”23 After all, parties are free to decide 
on their primary obligations. There are more examples: the penalty jurisdiction does not encompass 
situations where a reduced interest rate is charged on condition that payment is punctual but if it is not, 
the full rate will apply.24 Similarly, withdrawing an incentive for correct performance is not a penalty. 
Contractual payments can also be structured as options. A sum is payable as the price of the “right to 
pay late” – not upon the breach of an obligation to pay on time.  Although some courts and 
commentators like to describe the rule against penalties in absolute terms, there are accepted drafting 
techniques serving to circumvent it. Unsurprisingly, it has been suggested that the breach limitation is a 
“device for avoiding judicial scrutiny.”25 It is, however, difficult to state that “everything is a question 
of form” not substance or that a payment can be always taken outside of the penalty jurisdiction by 
relatively simple drafting.26 At times, the substance of a provision may be more important than its 
form.27 Lord Phillips suggested the parties could not evade review by ensuring that “contingencies that 
triggered liability to pay … did not constitute breaches of contract.”28 In sum, some courts are willing 
to “tolerate” blatant attempts to circumvent the rule against penalties, others seem less inclined to do so.  
 
“Distance from Breach” 
Notwithstanding the exceptional nature of the penalty jurisdiction and the resulting importance of 
certainty, courts display inconsistent approaches to the role of breach in the activation of the payment 
obligation. In Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Stanford,29 a sum was payable on termination. The 
owner could terminate for breach by the hirer as well as for his death or bankruptcy.  Had the sum been 
payable on the two latter events, it would have remained outside the penalty jurisdiction. It was also 
outside the jurisdiction if the hirer exercised an option to terminate. As the sum was payable 
irrespective of the reason for termination, the trial judge held that it could not be a penalty. Hodson LJ, 
however, held that termination for breach could not be disassociated from breach.30 It could not be 
assumed that if the right to terminate arose from breach and also from events unrelated to breach, then 
the law against penalties could not apply to the breaches as it would not apply to the other events. 
Otherwise, the common law could always be defeated “by incorporating in the same clause provisions 
dealing with the right to determine the contract on the occurrence of an infinite number of events only 
one of which is a breach of contract.” In other words, even if the event triggering payment was 
termination, not beach, the latter still drew the sum within the scope of the penalty jurisdiction. A 
different conclusion was, however, reached in UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v Francis.31 A sum 
was not subject to the rule against penalties because it was not payable on breach, but on the exercise by 
the landlord of his right to terminate the tenancy agreement. The fact that the termination was caused by 
tenant’s breach was disregarded. In Jervis v Harris 32 the question was whether the landlord's right to 
repair the property and then claim to recover their cost from the tenant, was a claim for damages for 
breach of a covenant by the tenant to keep the property in good repair. Although the court seemed to 
analyze the problem in terms of damages, it decided that the payment did not fall within the penalty 
jurisdiction because it had to be made upon the happening of a specified event other than breach. The 
event triggering payment was the expenditure by the landlord in effecting repairs, not the anterior 
failure of the tenant to repair. The claim was in debt not in damages. Although the event (repair of 
premises) was a direct consequence of breach, the payment itself was unrelated thereto. More recently, 
a more direct approach seems to be gaining ground: the penalty jurisdiction requires payment upon the 
breach itself – it does not suffice that breach forms part of the history leading to the payment.33 It """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
21 ibid at 535; see also Financings Ltd. v. Baldock [1963] 2 Q.B. 104 
22 ibid at 536 
23 ibid at 543 per Nicholls LJ  
24 Astley v Weldon (1801) 2 Bos & P 346 at 353 by Heath J; Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880) 5 App.Cas. 685, 702 
25 Garry A. Muir, ‘Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums’ (1985) Sydney Law Review at 519  
26 E Peel, ‘The Rule Against Penalties’ (2013) 129 LQR 152 at 154; C Conte, ‘The jurisdiction to relieve against penalties and 
forfeitures: time for a rethink’ (2010) 126 LQR 529 at 531 
27 Jeancharm Ltd v Barnet Football Club Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 58, Keene LJ at 27 
28 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6 
29 [1953] 1 Q.B. 86 
30 ibid at 116 
31 [2010] EWCA Civ 117 
32 [1995] EWCA Civ 9 
33 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Plc [2008] All ER (D) 349  
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appears that the scope of the penalty jurisdiction can be manipulated by adopting different approaches to 
the permissible “distance” of breach from the event activating payment. The interposition of another event 
(e.g. termination) may sever the link between breach and payment. 
 
Side effects 
The breach limitation is often criticized as capable of producing undesirable side effects. In Campbell 
Discount Co. Ltd. v Bridge,34 the hirer of a car informed the hire-purchase company in a politely 
worded letter that he could not keep up the payments and returned the car. The agreement permitted the 
hirer to terminate at any time by giving notice. Clause 9 provided that if the agreement was for any 
reason terminated before the vehicle became the hirer's property, the hirer would pay a sum equal to 
two-thirds of the hire-purchase price. Was this a penalty? An anterior question concerned the legal 
character of the letter: if it constituted the exercise of an option to terminate, the rule against penalties 
did not apply because the sum was the price of a right. If, however, the hirer was in breach – the 
payment fell within the penalty jurisdiction. The House of Lords held that the hirer was in breach and 
the sum was a penalty.35 What is more interesting, though, is the discrepancy of views regarding the 
ability to grant relief even if the hirer had exercised his option. Viscount Simonds and Lord Morton 
rejected such possibility, Lord Radcliffe left the question open whereas both Lord Denning and Lord 
Devlin stated that relief could be granted despite the absence of breach.36 Lord Devlin claimed that 
Clause 9 could not be a sham for one purpose and genuine for another.37 The case is most known, 
however, for Lord Denning’s “absurd paradox”: 
 
“if Bridge, after a few weeks, finds himself unable to keep up the installments and, being a 
conscientious man, gives notice of termination and returns the car, without falling into 
arrear, he is liable to pay the penal sum without relief of any kind. But if he is an 
unconscientious man who falls into arrear without saying a word, so that the company 
retake the car for his default, he will be relieved from payment of the penalty. Let no one 
mistake the injustice of this. It means that equity commits itself to this absurd paradox: it 
will grant relief to a man who breaks his contract but will penalise the man who keeps it. If 
this be the state of equity today, then it is in sore need of an overhaul so as to restore its 
first principles.”38  
 
According to Lord Denning, equity always relieved against penalties for non-performance of a 
condition in penalty bonds. The obligor bound himself by his bond to pay, on a condition as this: "If 
you are of good behavior, this obligation shall be void: but if you do not do so, then this obligation 
shall be of full force and effect." In many instances there was no obligation by the obligor to perform 
the condition (i.e. be of good behavior) but simply a bond that if he did not, he would pay the sum. 
According to Lord Denning, the penalty jurisdiction was not restricted to payments activated by 
breach.39 This very argument has been recently revived in an Australian case. 
 
Removing the Breach Limitation 
The breach limitation came under attack in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd40 (“Andrews”). Proceedings were brought against the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd (“ANZ”) with regards to certain banking fees. The High Court stated that the absence of breach or 
an obligation or responsibility to avoid the occurrence of an event upon which the relevant fees were 
charged, did not render them incapable of being characterized as penalties. The penalty jurisdiction 
applied even if a stipulation was not a promise, but the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event.41 The 
decision has met with skepticism.42 Apparently, there are no modern illustrations of the view presented 
therein. Prior to Andrews, it was well-established in Australia that the penalty jurisdiction extended 
only to payments on breach. 43 As in Campbell Discount, the High Court emphasized that rule against 
penalties originated in equity’s intervention in the enforcement of penal bonds. Prior to 1873 relief was 
given in respect of sums payable on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of events not involving breach """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
34 [1962] AC 600  
35 ibid at 601 
36 ibid at 631, 634 
37 ibid at 634 
38 ibid at 629 
39 ibid at 631  
40 [2012] HCA 30 
41 (2012) 290 ALR 595 at 598; [2012] HCA 30 at [12]   
42 J. W. Carter, Carter on Contract (Sydney, 2002 loose-leaf ed.) at 43-160, E Peel above at note 26 
43 ibid at 43-160; Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd (2008) 257 ALR 292; [2008] NSWCA 310 
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of contract.44 Despite the unified administration of law and equity, equitable doctrines retained their 
identity. As explained in Andrews, the ordinary bond was accompanied by a condition in the nature of 
a defeasance, the performance or occurrence of which discharged the bond, i.e. rendered the obligation 
to pay void. 45 The bond embodied a promise to pay a sum if the condition was not performed or did 
not occur. The promise concerned the payment, not the condition. The condition could be an event, not 
an act or omission of the obligor. As "condition" and “obligation” were not synonymous, the penalty 
jurisdiction was not limited to promissory stipulations. Simpson, however, explains that the 
performance of the condition was not a duty but a defence to the obligation to pay under the bond.46 
The condition was not actionable per se: a party was liable not because she promised to perform a 
condition but because she had executed a bond. Interestingly, Simpson also assumes that conditions 
required action on the part of the obligor.47  In fact, the main textbooks on the subject speak of 
performance not occurrence of the condition.48 So does Lord Denning in Campbell Discount. The 
obligor may not have been in a position to bring about the occurrence of a condition or could only do 
so with the co-operation of a third party. According to Simpson, conditions relating to uncontrollable 
events were void, i.e. the bond became unconditional. In case of conditions to be performed by 
strangers, the obligor could not excuse himself by showing that he had done his best - irrespective of 
whether his co-operation was required.49 The issue whether the condition was possible or controllable 
by the obligor affected its validity - not its promissory character. On this point, Simpson’s views 
diverge from those of the High Court. Simpson assumes the presence of a promise because if the event 
was beyond the obligor’s control, the condition was void. The High Court rejects any suggestion that in 
bonds, as a matter of substance, payment was activated by breach of an implied promise.50 Irrespective 
of these controversies we can agree that when the penalty jurisdiction developed conditional bonds 
were the basic contractual institution used to bind persons to the performance of a specific act or 
forbearance. 51  Contracts, in the modern sense of an exchange of promises, did not exist. The High 
Court admitted that the law respecting bonds was received from Roman law, at a period when stand-
alone promises to perform were not legally recognized. The only act “capable of being the subject of a 
promise” was the payment of money. 52 Promises to pay had to be embodied in a formalized document, 
such as a bond. When suing on a bond, the obligee brought an action in debt, not assumpsit. It was 
irrelevant why the debt arose.53 Seemingly, in bonds the “performance” or ”occurrence” of the 
condition and the payment of the sum existed in parallel. Were it not for the alleged absence of a 
promissory element in “conditions” one could speak of “alternative obligations” and conclude that the 
penalty jurisdiction applied to what we now refer to as primary obligations.54 We could also argue, 
however, that if penal bonds were the basic tool for forming contracts, it seems formalistic to deny the 
promissory character of conditions. The entire relationship between an “obligor” and “oblige” under a 
bond had a different character than in a modern contract. If you wanted two promises to do an act, you 
needed two bonds. The fact that the penalty jurisdiction evolved in a context predating enforceable 
promises, does not imply that it should govern payments activated by events lacking a promissory 
element. If equity’s general power to relieve against penalties fluctuated throughout the centuries,55 it 
seems irrelevant that at some point in time the rule applied to non-promissory events if at that time 
stand-alone promises to perform did not exist.  
 
Our approach should be practical and forward looking. Extending the penalty jurisdiction beyond 
breach not only ignores more than a hundred years of case law but also creates theoretical and practical 
problems. In modern times the penalty jurisdiction has equated penalties with overcompensation and 
deterrence from breach.56 Penalties are stipulated in terrorem. Liquidated damages pre-estimate loss.57 
Once the breach limitation is removed, this distinction becomes difficult to maintain. Absent breach, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
44 The year of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (UK). 
45 [2012] HCA 30 at 33-45; see also: Meagher, Gummow & Lehanes above at note 17 at 586 
46 ibid at 395 
47 ibid at 397 
48 Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, (13rd ed., 1988), para 1311; Meagher, Gummow & Lehanes above at note 17 at 586 
49 A.W.B. Simpson, ‘The penal bond with conditional defeasance’ (1966) 82 LQR 392 at 410 
50 For a detailed critique and historical analysis of the case see: J W Carter. W Courtney, E Peden, Andrew Stewart, G Tolhurst, 
Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction (2013) 30 J C L 99 
51 Simpson above at note 50 at 395  
52 [2012] HCA 30 at 15 
53 Muir above at note 10 at 504 
54 Muir above at note 10 at 504-507; McGregor para13-003 
55 Meagher, Gummow & Lehanes above at note 17 at 577 
56 Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1962] AC 600 at 622; Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752, 762G  
57 McGregor at 13-013  
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what is the exact scope of the penalty jurisdiction – and the limits of the freedom of contract?58 When 
are courts permitted to review contractual payments? What are the criteria of such review? It is 
difficult to re-interpret the rule against penalties as “deterrence from the occurrence of events.” More 
importantly, it is difficult to detach it from loss and compensation. After all, historically, the distinction 
between penalties and liquidated damages was tied to the ability to measure loss. If loss could be 
ascertained and compensation could be made the “penalty” was not enforced.59 It was the availability 
of compensation that permitted equity to intervene.60 In other words, the penalty jurisdiction (and the 
division between liquidated damages and penalties) is inherently related to loss resulting from breach!  
Interestingly, the High Court in Andrews agreed that ‘compensation’ is determined by reference to 
general principles of contract damages. Contract damages are, however, inseparable from loss and 
breach. If loss is unrelated to breach, we are dealing with contracts of guarantee or indemnities. 
Leaving aside the question how to calculate loss in the absence of breach, what is the permissible upper 
limit of contractual payments within the reach of such modified penalty jurisdiction? They should be a 
genuine pre-estimate of …what?61 A detailed critique of Andrews deserves nothing short of its own 
doctoral thesis. Historical arguments aside, the mere difficulty of establishing the criteria in evaluating 
sums activated by “non-promissory events” shows the dangers of removing the breach limitation.  
 
Existence of obligation 
We can only speak of the “breach limitation” if we can find breach. We can only speak of breach if 
there is a promise. The existence of an obligation, however, is not always indisputable.62 One way of 
avoiding the “breach limitation” and the question whether the penalty jurisdiction applies, is to deny 
that the purported “contract breaker” promised to do something. Courts can ignore the express wording 
of the contract (“I agree that” or “it is your responsibility”) and “downgrade” an obligation to an event. 
Courts can also “create” an obligation by implying that the purported “promisor” undertook to bring 
about an event or agreed to bear liability for its occurrence. A payment can be taken within or outside 
the penalty jurisdiction by means of a purpose-oriented construction, not necessarily by denying the 
importance of breach. As an aside, it can be observed that similar problems exist when distinguishing 
consideration from conditional promises.63 It may not always be clear whether one party “promised X” 
in exchange for another promise or whether this other promise is conditional on the occurrence, not 
performance of “X.”64 In this context, it has been suggested that the classification may depend on 
whether the occurrence of X is within the control of the purported promisor.65 Interestingly, similar 
arguments seem to gain relevance in discussions regarding the penalty jurisdiction. 
 
In Alder v Moore, 66 the defendant, a professional footballer, was injured. The insurers paid an agreed 
sum after obtaining the following declaration: "In consideration of the above payment I hereby declare 
and agree that I will take no part as a playing member of any form of professional football in the future 
and that in the event of infringement of this condition I will be subject to a penalty of the amount stated 
above. (emphasis added)" Once he started playing again, the underwriters claimed the return of the sum. 
The defendant contended that it was a penalty. The court held that, notwithstanding the word "penalty,” 
the obligation imposed on the defendant was to reimburse the underwriters that which they had paid on 
a false basis. The sum was not penal. Everything depended on whether the aforementioned undertaking 
contained a promise. Sellers LJ regarded the payment as conditional: the defendant had received it on 
the basis that he could not play again.67 He was not precluded from playing football. The underwriters 
only wished to be reimbursed if the defendant was not permanently disabled. The sum had to be 
returned because it was paid on a false basis, not in return for a promise that the player would not play 
again.68 Both Slade and Sellers LJ seemed to regard sum as payable on event and disregarded the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
58 Peel above at note 26 at154 
59 Simpson above at note 50 at 418; see also Meagher, Gummow & Lehanes above at note 17 at 578 
60 Peachy v Duke of Somerset  (1720) 1 Strange 447 
61 Carter above at note 51 at 115 
62 Difficulties in establishing the existence of an obligation and its breach were recognized by the High Court in OFT v Abbey, 
where, Andrew Smith J said that: It is necessary to examine separately each of the provisions to determine (i) whether it is truly 
of contractual effect (and not, for example, merely exhortatory or advisory); (ii) if it is of contractual effect, whether it imposes 
an obligation or prohibition upon the customer (rather than, for example, simply states a condition precedent before an obligation 
arises); and (iii) if it does impose a contractual obligation or prohibition upon the customer, whether the Relevant Charge is 
payable upon breach of it. 298 
63 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co Ltd [1983] 1 QB 256; Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114 
64 Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle [1960] AC 87 
65 R Bradgate Law of Contract, (4th ed., Butterworths 2010) para 2.57 
66 [1961] 2 Q.B. 57 
67 ibid at 64  
68 ibid at 76  
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express wording of the undertaking. Devlin LJ dissented and described the undertaking as “an unusual 
imposition” given that insurance policies are concerned with events. Policies were paid depending on 
whether or not the event has happened – not depending on whether the insured behaved in a particular 
manner after payout.69 He explained that if a man said: "If I play football again, I will pay you £500," 
he made a contingent promise to pay. If he said: "I will not play football again and, if I do, I will pay 
you £500," the practical result might be the same, but he was making two promises instead of one, the 
main promise absolute and the supplementary promise contingent. “In the former case, if he plays 
football again, he breaks no promise. In the latter case he does.”70 If the underwriters did not care 
whether the defendant played football again, why did they ask for a promise?71 Devlin concluded that 
“[I]t is argued that the money is payable on an event, the event being the infringement of the condition. 
This argument cannot be sound. If it were, every penalty clause would have been enforceable from the 
beginning of time.”72 In Devlin’s opinion, the undertaking contained a promise.  
 
Even in Andrews, the relevant clause was amenable to multiple interpretations. As it expressly 
prohibited overdrawing an account, any overdraft would be a breach. At the same time, it gave ANZ 
the discretion to allow the overdraft and in case it did – to charge a fee. The High Court could have 
avoided the need to debate the expansion of the penalty jurisdiction by construing the clause as 
containing an obligation on the part of the customer. Interestingly, the High Court “supported” its 
argument with a case, which illustrates a very strained construction of a clause allegedly containing an 
option not a prohibition. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham73 the contract for the hiring of 
films conferred the right to one public screening. The exhibitor was obliged to pay for each additional 
screening a sum equivalent to four times the original fee. The contract was construed in a manner 
precluding the applicability of the penalty doctrine: "there is no right in the exhibitor to use the film 
otherwise than on an authorized occasion. If he does so then he must be taken to have exercised an 
option so to do under the agreement. The agreement provides that he may exercise such an option in 
one event only, namely, that he pay a hiring fee of four times the usual hiring fee."74 One might ask: if 
there is no right to do “x” then how can doing “x” be the exercise of an option? If there is a prohibition 
to do something, there can be no exercise of a right to do it. There is breach. We can only speak of an 
exercise of a right if there are two alternative primary obligations and one can be performed without 
breaching the other.75 Nonetheless, the court chose to ignore the prohibition and treat a breach as an 
exercise of a right. A more straightforward illustration of the difficulties in establishing the presence of 
an obligation can be found in The Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc,76 The High Court 
analyzed the terms under which financial institutions provided banking services. In many instances, 
despite the use of expressions prima facie denoting the existence of a promise, it was established that 
the relevant provisions contained instructions, definitions and explanations of the parties’ rights.77 The 
High Court admitted that, paradoxically, a more favorable interpretation would be to establish an 
obligation and a resulting breach as in this way the consumer would “enjoy the common law protection 
relating to penalties.”78 
 
A separate group of cases concerns conditional and contingent payments. Talal El Makdessi v 
Cavendish Square Holdings BV79 implies that a review of the sum can be avoided (i.e. “the penalties 
doctrine may not have been engaged”) if payment of the outstanding part of the price is conditional on 
compliance with the contract. Reference was made to CMC Group Plc v Zhang80 where Dyson LJ 
indicated that conditional payments would not be subject to the penalty jurisdiction81 - even if the 
condition concerned an event remaining entirely within the control of the party making the payment. A 
more complex analysis of conditional payments was made in Euro London Appointments Ltd v 
Claesens International,82 a case concerning the ability to claim a refund of agency fees in the event an 
employee recommended by the agency terminated employment. The refund was conditional on the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
69 ibid at 68  
70 ibid at 69  
71  ibid at 70  
72 ibid at 71  
73 [1966] 2 NSWR 717 
74 ibid at 723 
75 See generally Carter on Contract, above at note 43 at 43-160 
76 [2009] UKSC 6 
77 [2008] All ER (D) 349 at 300-38, 314, 317 
78 ibid at 323 
79 [2013] EWCA 1539 at 123 
80 [2006] EWCA Civ 408 
81 ibid at 19  
82 [2006] EWCA Civ 385 
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client making timely payment of invoices. The question arose whether the introduction of a condition 
precedent to any right of refund could be a penalty. Chadwick LJ explained that Clause 4.1 stated: “to 
qualify for the following refund, the Client must pay the Agency’s fee within 7 days of the date of invoice.” 
That provision was a condition precedent and imposed no obligation on the Client. By itself, the first limb 
of clause 4.1 could not be regarded as a penalty. It had to be read, however, with paragraph (c) of clause 
3.1: “The Client agrees . . . (c) to pay the Agency’s fee within 7 days of the date of invoice”.  When read 
together, the condition precedent in the first limb of clause 4.1 reflected the obligation imposed by clause 
3.1(c). The court inquired whether the link between the condition precedent in first limb of clause 4.1 and 
the payment obligation in clause 3.1(c) brought the condition precedent within the rule against penalties. 
The answer was ‘No’. The condition precedent and the payment obligation were not inter-dependent. The 
court explained that the agreement could have provided that the fee be paid within 14 days, but that, to 
qualify for refund, the fee be paid within 7 days. The commercial effect would be identical – “save that the 
Agency could not sue for its fee until the 14 days had elapsed.”83 In such case, because failure to pay 
within the time limited by clause 4.1 would involve no breach of obligation, the rule against penalties 
would not apply. The position had to be the same where the time limit is clause 4.1 is identical to that 
imposed by the payment obligation in clause 3.1(c). The fact that the limit was the same in the two clauses 
was legally irrelevant.  Although Chadwick J stated that the rule against penalties had no application, he 
went on to analyze the condition precedent “just in case” and focused on deterrence and on the commercial 
justification. Chadwick LJ indicated that the link between the condition precedent and the payment 
obligation could bring the condition precedent within the reach of the rule against penalties.84 It remains 
unclear, however, in what circumstances such link would be present. Especially given that in all of the 
aforementioned cases the condition precedent concerned an “event” that was clearly within the control of 
the party obliged to pay upon its occurrence. Needless to say, the difference between a payment being 
conditional on the observance of certain contractual obligations and a payment being triggered by 
breach of such obligations seems cosmetic. It is also readily distinguishable from conditions and 
contingencies, which relate to events beyond the control of the party obliged to pay. A payment may be 
triggered by the commission of a criminal act or by bankruptcy.85  It can also be activated by an 
external event, such as weather conditions or a drop in the stock market. When payment can be 
triggered by an event not involving breach (i.e. unrelated to an obligation), the question arises whether 
the party called upon to pay undertook to prevent it from occurring.86 It has been suggested that if the 
event referred to in the condition activating payment is within the control of the party, “a promise 
should be inferred from agreement to the condition.”87  Unfortunately, Andrews further complicates the 
picture by stating that payments activated by non-promissory contingencies are subject to the penalty 
jurisdiction. Both situations are unsatisfactory: payments activated by conditions or contingencies that 
are within the control of the person obliged to pay seem to belong within the penalty jurisdiction. 
Payments activated by conditions or contingencies of a non-promissory nature, which lie outside of the 
control of the party obliged to pay should also remain outside of the penalty jurisdiction. Even such a 
division may create problems, though. Harder warns: “the difficulty of distinguishing instances of 
breach from other situations is merely replaced by the difficulty of distinguishing events within the 
promisor’s responsibility from other events.”88  
 
Another illustration concerns “take or pay” clauses, which can be interpreted as containing two 
obligations i.e. to order and to pay for a minimum amount or as containing only one obligation - to pay 
such amount irrespective of the order. In M & J Polymers Ltd v Imerys Minerals Ltd,89 the defendant 
asserted that the take or pay clause constituted a penalty. The court stated that although prima facie the 
clause concerned a debt not damages, this alone was not decisive. Following Euro London, the court 
searched for interdependence between the relevant clauses. It did not, however, clearly establish 
whether the defendant had an obligation to order minimum amounts. Instead, after broadly stating that 
the rule against penalties could encompass take or pay clauses, the court held that the clause in question 
was not penal as it was commercially justified.  
 
Divisions and differentiations 
In parallel to the uncertainties relating to the breach limitation, another area is becoming increasingly """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
83 ibid a 20 
84 ibid at 31 
85 see e.g. Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 406 
86 Sirko Harder, ‘The Relevance of Breach to the Applicability of the Rule against Penalties’ (2013) 30 JLC 52 
87 Carter et al above at note 50 at 133 
88 Harder, above at note 86 at 57 
89 [2008] EWHC 344 at 41,45 
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difficult to navigate. As indicated earlier, the rule against applies exclusively to secondary obligations. 
Primary obligations are not subject to review. The primary-secondary division may, however, be 
difficult to maintain.90 After all, distinguishing between promises to perform and promises to pay 
damages often seems artificial.91 The difficulty of distinguishing between primary and secondary 
obligations does not strengthen the argument that there should be a general possibility of relief but 
dictates that courts exercise extreme caution when reviewing contractual payments in general. It is one 
thing to state that the rule against penalties applies to secondary obligations only, it is yet another to 
draw a clear line between secondary and primary obligations. Any uncertainty in this area increases the 
risk of an inadvertent review of primary obligations and judicial interference with the substance of the 
commercial bargain. 
 
Consideration and compensation 
Sums payable on breach are often the subject of negotiation and meticulous calculation.92 The 
statement that contracting parties only think about performance not breach is incorrect.93  Sums payable 
on breach form part of the overall commercial exchange and may bear similarity to consideration. 
Compensation may in fact be difficult to distinguish from consideration. In Talal El Makdessi v 
Cavendish Square Holdings BV94 the buyer of shares insisted that sums forfeitable upon the breach of a 
restrictive covenant by the seller, were never meant to constitute a pre-estimate of loss but were an 
“adjustment of consideration.” Similar arguments were made in Andrews and in other cases.95 In 
Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia96 the breach, which consisted in the late payment of a loan, 
led to an increase in the interest rate. The court considered the increase “commercially justifiable” as 
its dominant purpose was not deterrence and the increase operated only prospectively.97  To be 
enforceable, however, the rate increase had to be modest.98 The court examined every component of 
the modified interest rate and concluded that there was “no reason in principle why a contractual 
provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract 
upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the 
circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was 
not to deter the other party from breach. (emphasis added) ”99 Instead of evaluating the increased rate 
in terms of loss that could have resulted from breach, the court examined it in terms of consideration - 
an operation best described as “unorthodox.” After all, interests rates are the price of money100 and the 
breach led to an increase in the price. In Lordsvale, the interest rate constituted both the price of the 
loan and the sum payable on breach of the loan agreement. Traces of this approach can also be found in 
older cases.101  
 
Once, however, a sum is analyzed in terms of consideration - not compensation - it is questionable 
whether the penalty jurisdiction, in fact any type of review, can be contemplated. Coleman J did not 
refer to any pre-estimate of loss but to the increased cost of money for “less good credit risk.”102 
Lordsvale illustrates the closeness and possible overlap between primary and secondary obligations. 
The decision must be praised for regarding the sum payable on breach as part of the overall 
commercial bargain. It does, however, complicate any further analysis by its references to 
consideration. What is the permissible increase in consideration? What is the point of reference?  
Coleman J left open the possibility for reviewing “exceptionally large increases” without providing any 
further criteria.103 An increased credit risk increases the likelihood of loss but it is unclear whether it 
increases its potential extent. Similarly, an increased cost need not always be synonymous with loss. 
An increased rate may in fact imply a higher profit. It is also unclear whether on the facts the credit risk 
was higher. Conceptually, it is also difficult to associate an increase in consideration with a pre-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
90 S Smith & P S Atiyah, ‘Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract’ (OUP 6th ed., 2006) observes that what is in effect an 
action for an agreed sum must also be compensatory in nature, p 391; A Burrows comments on the distinction as being a 
question of validity of promise rather than judicial remedy, in Burrows at 441 
91 Muir above at note 10 at 520 
92 Chen-Wishart above at note 11, at 275 
93 e.g. Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 at 539-540 
94 [2013] EWCA 1539 at 123 
95 Cine Bes Filmcilik Ve Yapimcilik v United International Pictures [2003] EWCA Civ 1669 
96 [1996] Q.B. 752 at 753, 764 
97 ibid at 763 
98 ibid at 753, 764 
99 ibid at 764  
100 Sempra Metals v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2008] A.C. 561  
101 Rolfe v Peterson (1772) 6 Brown's P. C. 470; C J Belmore Pty Ltd v AGC (General Finance) Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 507 
102 Lordsvale at 763  
103 Lordsvale at 767 
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estimate of loss. In Jeancharm Ltd v Barnet Football Club Ltd,104 late payment resulted in an interest 
rate of 5% per week (i.e. 260% per annum). Jacob J dismissed any attempts to justify the high rate in 
commercial terms and held it to be a penalty.105  It must be noted that in Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP 
Australia Pty Ltd,106 the Court rejected the argument that the penalty doctrine did not apply because the 
sum was part of the consideration, i.e. the purchase price would have been higher if the sum payable on 
breach was lower. The issue in point is not, however, whether the payment falls under the penalty 
jurisdiction. If it is activated by breach, as in Ringrow, this is beyond doubt. The issue is also not 
whether the sum constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of loss as it probably does not. The problem is that 
parties often negotiate and/or perceive the sum payable on breach as part of the commercial exchange 
and adjust its amount based on the price payable by the party who is potentially exposed to loss. Cases 
like Ringrow and Talal El Makdessi demonstrate the difficulty of drawing a clear division between 
primary and secondary obligations. It must be noted that in Talal El Makdessi, the court seemed willing 
to accept the “consideration argument” as part of the commercial justification of the sum. 
 
There are more difficulties stemming from the relationship between compensation and consideration. 
Parties are not only allowed to agree on any consideration but also on any risk allocation.107  The 
amount of risk assumed by one party determines the other terms of the contract, including the price 
paid by the other party. For the parties, the sum payable on breach may not only be a pre-estimate of 
loss but a description of the extent of liability assumed by the potential contract breaker108 or a 
reflection of the contemplated loss under the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale.109 In combination 
with the description of performance, the price and the limitation of liability, the calculation underlying 
the sum may point towards a transaction-specific risk allocation. Once we acknowledge that sums 
payable on breach describe or co-define the liability of the potential contract breaker, we must also 
acknowledge that both primary obligations and secondary obligations are contractually assumed.110 
When analyzing whether sums payable on breach constitute a genuine pre-estimate of loss, the courts 
never examine the price paid by the aggrieved party. In damages cases, however, the extent of 
contractual liability is often analyzed in light of the price (consideration) obtained by the contract 
breaker. In principle, neither party should “get something for nothing”111 or be allowed to obtain a 
gratuitous advantage.112 Logically, loss may easily exceed the price paid. The price may, however, 
affect how much loss is recoverable as damages.113 It is commonly accepted that the liability of the 
contract breaker is something that he must reasonably be expected to have assumed and have been paid 
for.114 Lord Hoffman explains the famous taxi driver example in terms of what liability a reasonable 
person would have understood the driver to have undertaken. If he was to accept increased liability if 
the passenger was late for his business appointment, he should demand a higher price.115  Similarly, in 
Photo Production v Securicor the price paid by the aggrieved party was an important determinant in 
establishing the extent of the contract breaker’s liability.116  As the amount of compensation is often 
affected by the amount of consideration, it is difficult to completely separate the two and analyze 
secondary obligations without any reference to primary obligations.  
“Hybrids” 
Apart from the unclear division between primary and secondary obligations, additional difficulties 
derive from the existence of provisions, which do not seem to fall into either category. They are 
referred to as ancillary, subsidiary, incidental etc. Some of them appear closer to secondary obligations 
(in fact, some of them seem synonymous with secondary obligations) others seem closer to primary 
obligations. The problem does not necessarily lie in their promissory or non-promissory character but 
in the difficulty to establishing whether they can be subject to review. Needless to say, review is 
inadmissible if a particular provision constitutes a primary obligation. Under the classic formulation of 
the rule against penalties (i.e. relating to payments on breach only) such “ancillary” provisions may 
come too close to primary obligations to fall within its ambit. Under the Andrews formulation of the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
104 [2003] EWCA Civ 58 
105 ibid at 16 
106 [2005] HCA 71 at 37,38 
107 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827 at 828, 846 
108 Muir above at note 10 at 514 
109 (1854) 9 Exch 341 at 354 and 355; see also: Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All E.R. 128 at 1446  
110 B Coote, ‘Contract as Assumption and Remoteness of Damage’ (2010) 26 JCL 211; Heron II [1966] 2 QB 695 at 730-731 
111 The Achilleas or Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc [2008] UKHL 48 at 13 
112 British Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499 at 508 
113 Chen-Wishart above at note 11 at 276; Lewis v Great Western Railway Company (1877) 3 QBD 195  
114 The Achilleas or Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc [2008] UKHL 48 at 13 
115 Lord Hoffman, ‘The Achilleas: Custom, Practice or Forseeability?’ (2010)14 Edin. L R 47 at 56 
116 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827 at 846, 852 
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rule against penalties, the opposite is true. In fact, the argument in Andrews suggests that the very 
removal of the breach limitation is directed at “ancillary” provisions. 
 
The High Court in Andrews relied on the following concept of penalty:  
 
“A stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty on a party (the first party) if, as a matter of 
substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour of a second party 
and this collateral stipulation, upon the failure of the primary stipulation, imposes upon the 
first party an additional detriment, the penalty, to the benefit of the second party. In that 
sense, the collateral or accessory stipulation is described as being in the nature of a security 
for and in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.”117  
 
If an obligation to pay money is collateral or accessory to another provision, the primary stipulation, 
then the collateral stipulation may be a penalty if it is designed to secure satisfaction of the primary 
stipulation, even though the primary stipulation is not promissory in nature. The High Court seems to 
‘supplement’ primary obligations with “primary” and “collateral stipulations,” the latter constituting 
security for the performance of the former.  Instead of breach, we have “failure of primary stipulations” 
followed by a review of collateral stipulations. It appears that in Australia, we no longer examine 
whether a particular sum was payable upon breach but whether parties have structured their agreement 
in terms of primary and collateral stipulations.118 Carter observes that due to the unclear formulation of 
the “principle” in Andrews, any collateral stipulation for an additional detriment is prima facie a 
penalty.119 It remains unclear whether there can be collateral stipulations that are (a) not subject to the 
rule or (b) not penalties in the first place. If so, how do we identify them? Apparently, the removal of 
the breach limitation creates the need to introduce more sub-categories within primary and secondary 
obligations…  
 
The legal character of contractual payments was also discussed in The Office of Fair Trading v Abbey 
National plc,120 where the Supreme Court inquired whether the fairness of certain bank fees related to 
overdraft facilities could be challenged by the Office of Fair Trading (the “OFT”) as excessive. The 
answer depended on the interpretation of Regulation 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 SI 1999/2083. The latter provided that  “[…] the assessment of fairness of 
a term shall not relate “to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services 
supplied in exchange.” Bypassing certain regulatory aspects of the case, the issue was whether the fees 
constituted “the price or remuneration.” If they did, a review of their fairness was not 
possible.121 Despite the different context, the case is relevant to the present discussion as it illustrates 
the difficulties inherent in categorizing contractual payments and establishing whether a particular 
payment constitutes consideration. Both the High Court122 and the Court of Appeal123 concluded that 
the relevant fees did not qualify as price or remuneration. The High Court also stated that they could 
not be penalties as their payment did not arise on breach.124 If the fees were neither payable on breach 
nor “in exchange” for banking services: what were they? The question was left unanswered. Both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal attempted to categorize various provisions in reference to their 
relationship to the core terms or the “essential bargain.” The resulting semantic exercise included 
mentions of “subsidiary,” “ancillary” and “incidental” terms.125 In trying to establish which fees 
constituted “price,” the Court of Appeal stated that the closer the payment was to the essential bargain, 
the more likely it was to fall within the exception in article 6(2), “but the more ancillary the payment is 
and the less likely it is to come to the direct attention of the consumer, the less likely it is to be within 
the concept of 'price or remuneration.”126 The Court of Appeal found it difficult to determine which 
fees were provided “in exchange” for the services in question and found for the OFT. The relevant fees 
did not constitute ‘price’ and were thus subject to assessment in terms of fairness.  The Supreme Court, 
however, reached the opposite conclusion: the fees constituted the banks' remuneration and were thus 
not capable of such assessment. According to Lord Walker, they were “consideration for the package """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
117  [2012] HCA 30 at 10 
118 Peel above at note 26 at155 
119 Carter et al. above at note 50 at 114 
120 [2009] UKSC 6 
121 ibid at 62 per Lord Phillips  
122 [2008] All ER (D) 349  
123 [2009] EWCA 116 
124 [2008] All ER (D) 349 at 299 per Smith J 
125 ibid at 350-355 
126 [2009] EWCA 116 at 52; [2009] UKSC 6 at 90  
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of banking services supplied to personal current account customers.”127 It was irrelevant that they were 
contingent and that most customers did not incur them. The Supreme Court analyzed the free-if-in-
credit system of charging and observed that it was likely to involve significant cross-subsidies.128 Lord 
Mance acknowledged that the fees may not be “directly related to the actual costs of providing any 
particular service triggering them.”129 The words “in exchange” contained in Regulation 6(2) had to be 
interpreted broadly. A sum needed not be directly linked to a specific service for it to be related to that 
service and to constitute consideration therefor. In fact, Lord Walker emphasized that it is unrealistic to 
look for perfect reciprocity between fees and services.130 The Supreme Court criticized the prior 
analysis pertaining to “ancillary” and “subsidiary” payments as converting the relatively simple 
language of regulation 6(2)(b) into a complex and uncertain value judgment.131 The identification of 
the price or remuneration was a matter of objective interpretation. The Supreme Court seemed to 
oppose the idea of creating divisions between various types of contractual payments. Lord Steyn’s 
observation that “in a broad sense all terms of the contract are in some way related to the price or 
remuneration,”132 was quoted with approval. 
 
It remains unclear, however, to what extent (if ay) the above reasoning can be transposed onto our 
discussion. When are we allowed to look at the totality of the contractual exchange and when do we 
need to isolate the respective payments and look for “direct links” to associated benefits? When do we 
examine the entire commercial bargain and when do we focus on the reciprocity between individual 
obligations? The purpose of the exercise must be remembered: determining which sums constitute 
consideration and are thus precluded from review. Even in Andrews, the High Court seemed to indicate 
that reciprocal benefits are exempted from the penalty jurisdiction. In other words, only payments not 
provided in exchange for some identifiable return are subject to review. Similarly, in OFT v Abbey, in 
determining which payments were provided “in exchange” the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
tried to match the fees to the services provided. Needless to say, in complex contracts involving cross-
subsidies between various services, such “matching” may not be possible. Carter observes that “lining 
up promises like bonded pairs” evokes penal bonds and an era predating bilateral contracts.133 Under 
modern contract law, all promises by one party are provided in consideration of all promises made by 
the other. Unfortunately, this leads back to the difficulty of distinguishing between primary and 
secondary obligations in the context of compensation and consideration. Additionally, both Andrews 
and OFT v Abbey point to another difficulty. Apart from defining collateral stipulations (sums not 
payable on breach and not provided in exchange) we must determine which collateral stipulations are 
subject to the rule against penalties. 
Unclear Conclusions 
It is difficult to reach clear conclusions or provide definitive recommendations. The only statement that 
can be made with confidence is that in drafting liquidated damages clauses, even sophisticated 
commercial parties face unprecedented difficulties. The law of liquidated damages has never been so 
uncertain. Leaving aside the difficulties created by the removal of the breach limitation and the 
extension of the possibility of review to payments triggered by non-promissory events, an equal 
amount of confusion is created by inconsistent approaches to the role of breach in activating payment 
and by the difficulty of categorizing contractual payments as primary or secondary obligations.  The 
more difficult it is to identify the legal character of a contractual payment, the greater the risk of 
inadvertently subjecting it to review under the penalty jurisdiction. The removal of the breach 
limitation further increases this risk.  It is one thing to subject sums to review, it is yet another to 
establish the criteria of such review. Absent breach, none of the possible criteria can relate to the 
compensation of loss. Similar problems arise with regards to the creation of additional categories of 
“stipulations.” How would we distinguish between them?  More importantly: which categories would 
be subject to review?  It appears that instead of creating artificial divisions between contractual 
payments to establish whether they can be reviewed, we should acknowledge that all sums payable 
under a contract are part of the exchange. Doctrinal integrity may point towards the need to vigorously 
defend the present form of the rule against penalties, including its (seemingly) strict limitation to sums 
payable on breach. At the same time, some recent cases highlight the theoretical inconsistencies of its """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
127 [2009] UKSC 6 at 47  
128 [2009] UKSC 6 at 103-105 per Lord Mance  
129 [2009] UKSC 6 at 105 per Lord Mance 
130 [2009] UKSC 6 at 68 per Lord Walker 
131 [2009] UKSC 6 at 108  
132 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52 at 34  
133 Carter above at 51 at 115 
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current formulation. It appears incorrect (if not dangerous) to use an institution that prohibits 
deterrence from breach to review the commercial substance of contracts. The rule against penalties 
reflects the general equitable principle not to enforce oppressive or unconscionable transactions. It does 
not reform commercially imprudent transactions. 134  Given its exceptional nature, the penalty 
jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly - even with regards to sums payable on breach. Once the 
latter are regarded as part of commercial bargain, it is more difficult to subject them to review. If, 
however, a payment is unrelated to the breach of a contractual promise, it comes dangerously close to 
being a contractual promise.  Any review seems unacceptable.  
 
 
 
 
  ""
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
134 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 at 723 by Lord Wilberforce 
